THE EPRDF AND CRISIS OF THE ETHIOPIAN STATE
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By Aregawi Berhe
African Studies Centre,
Leiden University INTRODUCTION Present day Ethiopia constitutes a multi-ethnic society where ethnic politics and ethnic mobilization had been the path to power and the pillars to maintain it, perceptibly since the Era of Princes (1769-1855). During that period, Ethiopia was parcelled or ‘decentralized’ in disorderly fashion among local princes, who drew support from their ethnic or sub-ethnic base. To this day, ethnic grounds have been the power base of Ethiopian political elites under various banners and forms.
Ethiopia is now facing yet
another experimental policy under the autocratic regime of the Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) whose core element is the
Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which set up an ethnic based
federal government structure with a constitutional “right” for
nationalities to secede. After a decade of trial, this experiment too does
not at all appear to work and has instead sown the seeds of recurring
conflicts that deeply wreck the state.
Despite the unwarranted foreign
policy guidelines pursued by the successive regimes, Ethiopian rulers
never find it difficult to sustain the backing of one or the other foreign
power – powers unscrupulously bent on their national or global interests.
This relationship has left the Ethiopian state in perpetual crisis. Such
relationship has even lead states like that of Somalia to disintegrate.
I. Major Factors Locking
the Ethiopian State in Crisis
True, the Ethiopian state is
one of the oldest states in the world (see Conti-Rossini, Carlo and Tamrat,
Tadesse), yet Ethiopia is a troubled state that finds itself at the bottom
of the global community of nations by all economic, social and political
measures. The roots of its problems lie primarily in its self appointed
leaders who take charge of governance at their will, never to deliver even
a fraction of what they promise as they ascend to power. Although foreign
actors have their lot shaping and sustaining the predicaments Ethiopia has
to live with, the lion share of the responsibility goes to the leadership
that controls the internal process of governance, which also facilitates
the intrusion of the external factors.
To understand the enormous
problems compounding Ethiopia, one may go back in history to have an
insight of the evolution the Ethiopian State had to undergo and link it up
with its present socio-economic standing – an integral inference that
should not be over looked if a comprehensive understanding of the present
impasse is the concern. It is then exceedingly important to look in to the
prevailing determinant factors that are liable to its existing plight as
the first step of resolving the difficult impasse Ethiopia is
encountering.
The major factors that have put
the Ethiopian State in deep rooted crisis bad governance being the main
reflection, could be classified into two: (1) the internal factors, (2)
the external factors.
(a) The leadership, which in
most cases is authoritarian, lacks accountability and transparency and
entrenched in corruption.
(b) An elite, which is
fragmented on – ethnic divides – religious affiliations – vested
interests.
(c) Disempowered society, which
finds it difficult to defend its interest collectively or influence
governance. A combination of State repression, disorienting elite and an
authoritarian cultural legacy contribute to dispossess the society of
acquiring empowerment.
(2) The External Factors, the
major players being:
(a) Powerful states who put
their national interest over and above the individual or collective
interests of weak nations or regions, giving no regard to empowerment.
(b) Donors and NGOs who seek
local elite alliance that have already been impediment to the growth of
civil society which strive to empower itself.
One should also denote that the
culture of resolving pertinent matters related to power and politics with
the gun had enabled unpopular forces and authoritarian governments to
prevail over consent and the rule of law. The need of addressing such a
violent culture over the prevalence of dialogue and reason as a
concomitant factor should be well taken.
To demonstrate the interplay of
the internal and external factor on governance out lined above and the ill
functioning of the state, Ethiopia, which is also at the centre of the
Horn of Africa politics, is a best case in point. Most African
states, by and large, may not be too far from this scenario as well.
II. Deepening of the State
Crisis
Given the post-Cold War
geopolitical scenario and the fall of the military dictatorship under
Colonel Mengistu, it was essential for the victorious TPLF-led EPRDF
forces to secure the backing of the USA and its European allies and Israel
(which were contented with the fall of the former pro-Soviet military
regime) in order to consolidate their position. The US spared no time
supporting the militarily stronger TPLF. It is ironic, though, to note
that the so-called Stalinist TPLF, seen at the height of the cold war as
terrorist by the ‘free democratic western alliance’, being supported by
the US and Europeans as it ascends to power.
The TPLF and its affiliate
organisations went on unilaterally creating a transitional government in
1991 - installing a new constitution and implementing a highly
controversial policy of ethnic politics which grants the right of
secession to the over eighty ethnic groups in the country (1995
constitution, art.39, no.1). The restructuring of the Ethiopian state
proceeded in accordance with the dictates of the EPRDF-led transitional
government, with the leadership of the TPLF at the helm of the new
political set up. Although some US and European admirers would like to
call this “a democratisation process by a new breed of leaders” with out
seriously looking into the nature of this force and the circumstances in
which it seize power, critical observers however had warned of the dangers
this path entails. Terence Lyons correctly pointed out that: the EPRDF led
throughout this transition period and capitalized on its commanding
position to consolidate its power. The party dominated the political
landscape by virtue of its military power (Lyons 1996:121). “The
electorate’s choice was basically between the EPRDF and their allies or no
vote”, declared the Norwegian Observer Group (1992:12). Finally in
August 1995, a new government was declared ‘elected’ with the same
political grouping. The post-Mengistu political processes, including the
formation of the sovereign Eritrean state in 1991 (see Hagos: 1995), as
one could anticipate, have led to serious confrontations between the new
regime in Addis Ababa and a multitude of oppositional groups of various
political and ideological persuasions.
Whenever such conflicting
political, social, cultural and economic interests lack space for
compromise or broad-based consensus, and when local governance proceeds
without deliberation or consultation at the popular level, long-term peace
drifts beyond reach. If the absence of war does not necessarily mean
peace, then today’s Ethiopia (where the seeds to yet another cycle of
conflict are being sown), certainly illustrates this argument.
With the TPLF in power, ethnic
based national entities in Ethiopia have entered a new era, where
different political arrangements were anticipated. The TPLF (here after
better referred to by its official name, EPRDF), without the consensus of
the Ethiopian people or that of the numerous political organisations,
hastily imposed a highly ethnicised political experiment. According to
this experiment, every ethnic group is allowed to secede and form its
independent state; thus Ethiopia could find itself divided into not less
than eighty ethnic-based states. This policy, ostensibly meant to draw
support and legitimacy from the numerous ethnic groups for the TPLF, has
only served to expedite the emergence of another wave of ethnic conflicts,
besides leaving the entire multiethnic, multilingual, multi-religious
population in a state of confusion.
As to the realisation of the
collective aspiration of the Tigrayans, who had paid dearly during the
struggle, no meaningful change has occurred, except that they served as a
steppingstone for the TPLF leaders to seize power over the whole of
Ethiopia, a power without a social base. To make matters worse, the
Tigrayan population, on the one hand, is seen by other Ethiopians as an
accomplice of the TPLF, while on the other hand is forced to support the
TPLF leaders in Addis Ababa, in their confrontation with the Ethiopian
opposition. The reason why no opposition party, other than the TPLF, is
allowed to work in Tigray is simply to claim undivided support for the
ruling party, hence trampling over the democratic rights of the Tigrayan
people to organize an opposition.
True, it was the combined
effort of the Ethiopian peoples and various liberation movements, albeit
the significant military role played by the TPLF, which has brought the
seventeen years of the ‘Derg’s’ military dictatorship and reign of terror
to an end. Most Ethiopians welcomed the change, genuinely hoping that
who-ever came to power this time, may not be as horrendous as the military
junta. In the beginning, no one seemed to contest that this was a positive
achievement, although some people were casting their reservation because
of the TPLF’s wavering stand on Ethiopian unity and its ideology, which
from the beginning was ultra-left but now appearing to embrace the Western
liberal democracy and ‘free’ market. Many foreign governments - the US
taking the lead - also offered instant recognition to the new rulers
assuming that they will easily join their club unlike the ‘pro-Soviet’
military dictators.
The concern of the US-led
Western powers was obvious. They wanted to arrest the expansion of
“Islamic Fundamentalism” which was seen to be posing a serious challenge
to their cultural values and a threat to their material interest in and
around the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Sudan, where Islamist
government is gaining ground, and occupying a strategic position in The
Horn has to be checked from influencing the region. The US found the TPLF,
a better-organised and manageable military force in Ethiopia that could
accomplish the strategic tasks it wanted to pursue. Despite its leftist
rhetoric, Meles Zenawi’s TPLF swiftly came to terms with the US, and has
come to be an ally in harnessing the anticipated opposition from the other
Ethiopian political forces and the people at large. The US was more than
willing, therefore, to facilitate the seizure and consolidation of power
in Ethiopia by the TPLF.
As the forces of the TPLF and
EPLF were closing in on Addis Ababa and Asmara respectively, in London, on
27 May 1991, Herman Cohen, US assistant secretary of state for Africa, met
with leaders of the militarily stronger TPLF, OLF and EPLF and the
delegates of the collapsing ‘Derg’, ostensibly to negotiate a peaceful
transition of power. Other political forces that could have affected
Ethiopia’s future were ignored. A golden opportunity for a political
settlement was brushed aside in favour of military solution. Before a
negotiated settlement was reached, at the end of May 1991, Meles Zenawi,
after spending a night in the American Embassy in Khartoum, suddenly
showed up in Addis Ababa to head the forthcoming Ethiopian government.
The US and its allies spent no
time granting the new regime diplomatic recognition as well as financial
aid. US military and technical experts, including constitutional advisors
began flowing to Zenawi’s administration within months of taking office. A
year later, in an interview with the Ethiopian Commentator (EC), Mr. Marc
Baas, US Ambassador to Ethiopia said, “The overall policy of the US
towards Ethiopia is to promote the process of democratisation in this
country and the opening up of the free market economy. We have done a
great deal in the last year [1992]. I have signed agreements for over 105
million dollars in emergency food and humanitarian assistance, in addition
to over 170 million dollars of development assistance” (EC: May 1, 1993,
p.31-32). The commitment of the US to hook Ethiopia into its globalisation
orbit lies in the fact that geo-politically, Ethiopia is an important
country in Africa - coping with peace keeping, hosting mediatory talks
between contesting African political actors, tackling the Islamist state
of Sudan and similar radicals in Somalia with the co-operation of Uganda,
Eritrea and Egypt for which the EPRDF regime is remunerated $100 million
worth military aid a year from the US.
Zenawi’s regime, with its
extremely narrow and uncertain social base, was confronted internally,
with the opposition of the Ethiopian people that denied it the mandate to
rule the country, and externally, with the pressure the US exerts to fight
its proxy war with Islamist Sudan. Zenawi’s choice appears to be
repressing the opposition of the people and conceding to US policy. In a
poor country like present day Ethiopia, that is confronted by a range of
internal and external problems, a stable government is less likely, if not
impossible, to emerge under such administration ridden with conflicting
policies. People, who argue that the current government is better than the
former military regime of Mengistu, should better know that the fall of
one form of dictatorship does not necessarily mean a transition to a
democratic and peaceful system. The difference was only that Mengistu was
pro-Soviet and Zenawi became pro-West, yet both doing the same thing to
their people.
In fact, in today’s Ethiopia,
an unprecedented wave of resistance is in the making. The EPRP in the
west, the OLF in the south, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in
the south-east, the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Front (ARDF) in the east
have stepped up their fight against the EPRDF. Many other political
organisations, including the Oromo National Congress (ONC), the Southern
Ethiopian People’s Democratic Union (SEPDU), the All Amhara People’s
Organisation and the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP) from within and the
Tigrayan Alliance for National Democracy (TAND), the Ethiopian Group for
Social Democracy (EGSD), the Ethiopian Medhine Democratic Party (MEDHIN)
and many others from outside the country are pressing hard to bring about
a fundamental change in Ethiopia. Time and again, all these organisations
have been publicly calling for peace and reconciliation. The EPRDF,
however, has remained deaf to all popular calls for peaceful change and
has continued to push the country to a state of chaos and civil war.
MLLT, as the core of the future
Ethiopian Marxist Leninist Party, is the only correct party free from all
sorts of revisionism (Trotskyism, Maoism...) that could constitute a
proletarian-peasant dictatorship to liberate the Ethiopian people
(Constitution of MLLT 1985:1).
Any other political
organisation that does not ideologically correspond to that of MLLT’s was
labelled ‘reactionary’ and ‘anti-people’, and hence should be cleansed. In
an interview with The Independent, at the end of 1989, the present
Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, asserted that “the Soviet Union
and other Eastern-bloc countries have never been truly socialist. The
nearest any country comes to being socialist as far as we are concerned is
Albania” (The Independent, 28 Nov. 1989). To him, as was
clearly maintained in the same interview, only this party could lead to a
“fully democratic state” (Ibid). The officially published programme and
declarations of the MLLT and TPLF are no longer visible since Zenawi
joined the camp of the US; he prefers not even to mention that he was a
leftist. Eclectic as it appears, Zenawi’s policies have drawn the whole
country into a state of chaos and confusion, because of the
incompatibility between what he thinks and what he does. I will look now
into some of the practical measures and policies employed by the TPLF-led
EPRDF, in Ethiopia’s complex power politics.
III. Democracy at Bay
Mengistu’s authoritarian regime
and its reign of terror forced thousands of young Ethiopians to take up
arms and fight back organised under national and multi-national fronts.
All fought basically for a democratic and egalitarian system. Doing best
on the military front however, in May 1991 the TPLF managed to seize state
power forming the EPRDF, a so-called umbrella organisation.
After years of struggle, the
time for Zenawi’s “fully democratic State” and its ‘revolutionary’ slogans
of democratic rights, national equality, freedom of expression and
organisation, rule of law and human rights came to be tested - rights for
which the people have struggled for decades and await in earnest for their
realisation.
Regrettably, EPRDF leaders took
no time to prove that in practice they are no different from their
predecessors, the military dictators. As they grabbed power, they began
systematically spreading their offensive campaign against legitimate
democratic organisations who like them had fought the Mengistu regime. To
silence any opposition elements within the country and deny freedom of
expression that could perhaps lead to mobilise people against their
unpopular policies, EPRDF leaders have launched a reign of terror starting
by opening fire on peaceful demonstrators of Addis Ababa University
students only a few days after they seized state power.
Encouraged by opposition
parties within and outside the country, many papers critical of the
government began to emerge. Yet, whenever critical remarks against the
government appear on the papers, the respective editors, journalists and
publishers were immediately dragged to prison accused of negative
campaigning against the government. For instance, according to Amnesty
International:
“Since October 1992, over 100
journalists and publishers of private newspapers and magazines in Addis
Ababa have been arrested and a score or more others have been summoned for
interrogation. Two journalists have “disappeared” (Amnesty
International 1995:10).
Thousands of members of
political organisations, unions and associations who posed serious
challenges and espouse different programmes from that of the EPRDF are at
present languishing in prisons and detention centres. In the same report,
Amnesty International reveals that over 20,000 officials and members of
the OLF, AAPO, EPRP, ONLF and Southern Ethiopian Political Parties are
detained without due process of law and subjected to harsh imprisonment
and torture (Ibid:13-27). After giving details of gross violations of
human rights including names of people killed by EPRDF forces, the
Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO) states that:
The rigid, self-righteous and
uncompromising position of those in power and their apparent determination
to hold the monopoly of power by any means is matched by the thwarted
peace efforts and frustrated ambitions of the opposition parties
(EHRCO 7th Report, 26 Aug. 1994).
In the same vein, in its
resolution of 17-05-2001, the European Parliament “calls for the holding
of a general inter-Ethiopian dialogue, with all the opposition groups,
including armed movements and the representatives of civil society, on the
peace and national reconciliation provided for by the 1998 Paris
Conference, in order to achieve a peaceful resolution of the country’s
political, economic and social problems” (Resolution on Human Rights in
Ethiopia, B5-0360, 0363, 0370, 0376, 0386 and B5-0396/2001). From day one in power, the EPRDF apparently has been unpopular basically because it came to power by military force and remained in power using the same instruments of force that brought it to power. This partially explains why the EPRDF is engaged in gross violation of human and democratic rights. The democracy talked about by the EPRDF and its allies is nothing more than a fashionable paper formality that camouflages the true nature of the EPRDF leadership. In brief, the nature of EPRDF’s eclectic ideology and the application of the policies that emanated there by had generated immeasurable uncertainty in the country’s bureaucratic apparatus deterring the functioning of the state. The so-called constitution, crafted by the EPRDF and its advisors was neither legitimate nor could regulate the role of the state as it was basically a programmatic constitution of the ruling party.
As events revealed, the new
constitution, no matter what was inscribed in it appearing to defend the
rights of citizens, nevertheless like Haile Sellassie’s and Mengistu’s
constitutions was no more than a piece of paper granted by autocratic
leaders that could only serve the interest of the ruling group.
IV. Ethnic Polarisation
The TPLF-led EPRDF come to
power promising, among other things, the right to self-determination,
including and up to secession for which it had fought rigorously for
sixteen years. So it is not surprising when article 39, No. 1 of the EPRDF
sponsored new constitution reads: Every nation, nationality and people in
Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the
right to secession. This may lead to generate the feeling that an
unlimited political right is granted to all the nationalities in Ethiopia.
In practice however the EPRDF seems to show no concession to other forces
with the same demand. To this effect, it had declared war on the Ogadeni
National Liberation Front (ONLF), the intensity of the war and its heavy
cost being reported even in the government’s papers (see Ethiopian Herald,
Jan - Feb. 1997).
One is then bound to wonder
what are the principles of the EPRDF regarding the right to
self-determination and inquire how the EPRDF reconciles its theory and
practice of self-determination, in particular article 39 of its new
constitution. Of course the EPRDF does not provide a clear explanation to
this riddle, nor to a number of pertinent political and economic questions
that will be raised below.
It is fair to admit that there
is no easy answer to such complex issue of self-determination. Genuine
democratic endeavour could only pave the way to reach an acceptable
solution. The contradictory position of the EPRDF regarding
self-determination however, lacks both a genuine approach and democratic
participation by the people.
As we have noted earlier, the
TPLF, before and after establishing the EPRDF in 1991, obviously
understood that as an ethnic-based national movement for sixteen years,
its social base was restricted to Tigray, with a population of about four
million in a vast country of fifty five million people. When it became
apparent that Mengistu’s regime was collapsing and a power vacuum was
imminent, and as a better organised military force than the other
opposition movements, the TPLF made a swift advance to the capital, in the
name of the EPRDF, which was created late in the day to extend the image
of a multi-national force. The strength and participation of the EPDM
(composed of about two hundred members) and OPDO (just formed of few POWs
from the military regime) - organisations that helped the TPLF form the
EPRDF - was only nominal. Suddenly the TPLF found itself in a sea of
people, it has never been fit to mobilise or organise during its struggle
and whose allegiance has been to other political organisations most of
which have been antagonistic to the TPLF/EPRDF. The highly motivated TPLF
army which expected to get a warm hero’s welcome for its sacrifice of
getting rid of the military dictators had to suffer verbal, and at times
physical, attack from the non-Tigrayan majority of Ethiopians.
Without having thought through
of its application and having failed to anticipate the consequences of its
actions, hastily, the TPLF declared the right to self-determination
including secession and invited all ethnic groups in the country to
organise on an ethnic basis and join the EPRDF. The EPRDF leaders naively
hoped the newly formed ethnic organisations, which understandably lack the
necessary organisational experience and strength to run their own affairs
by themselves would rush to join the EPRDF in the citadel of power,
thereby hoping to draw support and develop legitimacy to rule the country.
Contrary to the expectation of
the EPRDF leaders, many ethnic organisations have began to demand their
version of self-determination, including secession without even
considering their politico-economic viability as independent
nation-states. The Ogadeni, the Oromo, the Afar and the EPRP are at
present engaged in armed struggle against the TPLF-EPRDF regime. Many
others are waging propaganda war from within and outside the country, some
of which are contemplating armed confrontation, openly stating that ‘those
who come with a gun can only go with a gun.’
The EPRDF’s ethnicised
political device to generate legitimacy and consolidate hold of power
proved to be not only a failure, but also ‘a thorn in the flesh’ for the
regime. The no less than eighty ethnic groups in Ethiopia, which thought
to exercise the unlimited political, economic and social rights that go as
far as secession to form a nation state, as inscribed in the new
constitution, have become unmanageable, largely because of the
ill-conceived experiment of ethnic politics of the EPRDF. This is why we
find these days a new wave of ethnic-based national challenges of many
nationalities: Afars, Ogadenis, Oromos, Sidamas, Beni Shangulis, to
mention but a few.
Ethnic-based nationalism,
generally speaking, being a reaction to national domination or oppression,
within it bears - what EPRDF is fostering - an exclusionist motive
reflected in many ways by all nationalist actors and expressed as ‘we’
vis-à-vis ‘them’. “At the heart of nationalism”, argues John Keane, “is
its simultaneous treatment of the Other as every thing and nothing. The
Other is seen as a knife in the throat of the nation” (Keane 1995:193).
And as Peter Alter further argues, “Nationalism, to all intents and
purposes, means undisguised political egoism. As an ideology it preaches
solidarity with and willingness to make sacrifice to one particular social
group” (Alter 1994:118). Carried away by its military success, the TPLF
conveniently opened a Pandora’s box that could not be closed so easily,
except, perhaps, by sheer force which obviously creates a countervailing
force that could bring the demise of the former.
To fight domination or
oppression and opt for an egalitarian state of relationships is a
desirable thing, but to go for secession, brushing aside centuries old
social, economic and political interdependence is problematic. Failing to
learn from the humiliating defeat of the former dictators or even from the
predicament of neighbouring Somalia, the EPRDF leaders are keen on
promoting the ethnic factor by pushing it to its extreme limit. At least
two instances of this short-sighted ethnic policy could be referred to:
Another significant political
force marginalized by EPRDF’s ethnic politics is the whole spectrum of
multi-national political organisations. This Ethiopian political segment
puts emphasis on the unity of the people and the integrity of the country
as one ‘national’ entity. Some of these organisations - like the EPRP and
MEISON - have a long history of struggle no less than that of the TPLF.
These multi-national forces have been at loggerheads with the TPLF ever
since its inception and their relationship worsened when it seized power.
Despite the hostility reflected on both sides, these organisations
together with other ethnic forces, have taken the initiative to peacefully
negotiate with the TPLF. The Paris Peace and Reconciliation Conference of
March 1993 and the Carter Peace Centre Conference of February 1994 could
be referred to as some of the constructive endeavours on the part of the
multi-national opposition parties. None of these peaceful challenges seem
to convince the EPRDF leaders, while anger and frustration was mounting in
the quarters of the opposition as well as with the peace mediators.
In a letter written to the opposition organisations in 18 March 1994,
former US President Jimmy Carter stated his frustration as follows:
“the negotiation with the government could not proceed further
because of President Meles’s unwillingness to proceed on the proposed
terms of negotiation.”
When the doors to negotiated
settlement of existing conflicts are closed and state repression becomes
the response to peaceful initiatives, what could the next plausible step
of these multi-ethnic and the numerous ethnic organisations be? How do we
influence the current leaders to get into a democratic track and avoid
violence as a means to achieve ends? Such are the questions revolving
these days in the minds of many concerned Ethiopians. Naturally, a lot of
proposals are being put forward to these ends. Some propose a
“comprehensive national civil disobedience organised at the grass roots
level” (Araya 1996:32), as the only hope for Ethiopia’s predicaments.
There are many others who argue that power holders, as a rule, listen only
to countervailing power, and therefore the only remaining option to set
Ethiopia free from the shackles of ‘the dictators’ who remain deaf to the
repeated calls for peace - is to use force. Whichever direction the
struggle may take, Ethiopia seems to face yet another catastrophe, perhaps
worse than the present chaotic situation.
V. Can’t We Break the Cycles
of Conflict?
No matter how complex this
question appears to be and the solution not within easy reach, the need to
confront it, however, is indisputable.
The present political crisis in
Ethiopia basically emanates from the unbridled desire of the TPLF leaders
to monopolise power in all its aspects as was evident with their
predecessors. This impasse has two major effects: on the conflict of the
EPRDF with the opposition forces on one hand and on the mounting tension
among ethnic groups on the other.
The US and its allies’
one-sided intervention, which had ignored the will of the people and the
role of the opposition forces, also aggravated this crisis. Intellectuals
who for various reasons support the EPRDF are worsening the crisis by
blindly defending the very wrong policies that are recreating conflicts.
Perhaps Ethiopia’s leaders love to adulate and be swayed by uncritical
remarks like that of Stephen Ellis who with carefully selected words
declares that “Ethiopia is experimenting with an ethnically based
constitution which to an outsider, looks hazardous. But perhaps it looks
different to those who live in Ethiopia” (Ellis 1996:271). Ironically,
while Ellis writes about “the atrocities committed in the name of Islam in
Algeria and Egypt” (Ibid: 272), he does not refer to what accompanied the
experiment - i.e. a catalogue of war atrocities perpetrated on the Oromos,
Ogadenis and Afars in the South and East and a plethora of human rights
violations, ‘disappearances’, large-scale imprisonment and torture - in
short, organised state terror throughout the country, including Tigray,
the ethnic base area of the TPLF. Adhana Haile Adhana goes even further to
tell us that, “In politics, the Ethiopian peoples have already stepped in
the ‘Garden of Eden’ (Adhana, 1995:93); an opportunist position without
content, which even Zenawi himself would not dare repeat.
The opposition forces are
regrouping and reorganising themselves to wage a struggle for political
space. Some of them have already formed an alliance, like the Coalition of
the Ethiopian Opposition Political Organizations (CEOPO), and have
undertaken a political offensive, with civil disobedience as one of their
tactics. Others like the OLF, ARDU and ONLF are already engaged in armed
struggle in the southern and eastern parts of the country.
Worst of all, the ethnic
tension apparently is mounting sharply every day. The ethnic policy of the
EPRDF which was meant to draw support from the no less than 80 ethnic
groups in the country - a fatally simplistic approach - has only created
an unmanageable crisis never experienced in the history of Ethiopia. To
assert their ‘independent’ identity and justify their claim to statehood
of their own (no matter regarding the viability of the imagined state),
almost all the ethnic groups have come forward with their exclusive
agendas. The present chaotic predicament reminds many Ethiopians of their
mid 17th to mid 19th history, the ‘Era of Princes’, when, as Markakis puts
it “provincial rules waged a protracted struggle for supremacy...central
power was entirely eclipsed and the throne itself remained vacant” (Markakis
1990:15). These ethnic agendas pretend they have nothing socially,
politically, economically or historically in common with the other ethnic
compatriots in the country.
Failing to realise the extent
to which ethnic claims could be stretched, EPRDF leaders are frantically
trying to reverse the proliferation of ethnic movements by launching state
terrorism instead of committing themselves to democratic dialogue. These
leaders should have better grasped how far ethnic sentiments could be
destructive, looking at realities in Rwanda, Somalia or the former
Yugoslavia. As Eugeen Roosens critically observes, “the study of ethnic
phenomena reveals how far ethnic ideology and historical reality can
diverge from each other; how much people feel things that are not there
and conveniently forget realities that have existed” (Roosens 1989:161).
Present day Ethiopian political realities by and large, reflect this
critical assertion. It is only through engagement in a democratic and
rational dialogue that one can make people feel the positive side of their
history and appreciate harmonious relationship and unity.
Contrary to the preposterous
position of Adhana and his likes, the gross violation of human and
democratic rights - essentially state terrorist acts - perpetrated by
Zenawi’s regime have been repeatedly reported by many concerned
organisations including Amnesty International, the European Parliament,
the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), the International Federation
of Journalists (IFJ), Africa Watch, to mention but a few. In its ‘A
World-wide Survey’ annual report for the year 1993, the Committee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ) writes, “For the second year running, Ethiopia
held more journalists in prison than any other country in Africa” and gave
the list of journalists in prison as of March 1994, that ranked Ethiopia
second in the world (CPJ 1994:6-7). Prisons are over-crowded and there is
no fair trial. According to EHRCO (1996: 13), only five court benches are
handling over 35,000 cases. Of the several thousand detainees who have
been accused of committing human rights violations and war crimes during
the ‘Derg’ regime, a considerable number have not yet been formally
charged even six years after the fall of the ‘Derg’. No plausible reason
is given for the delay, except that the present leaders do not want to set
the precedence that will try them tomorrow.
In countries with very low
economic development, like Ethiopia, contention over the scarce economic
resource, mainly land but other advantages too, also consolidates ethnic
alliances. “The longing for material goods does not by itself produce
ethnic identity or ethnicity ...Ethnicity, however, is directly concerned
with group formation, and thus with power relation” (Roosens 1989:158).
The political élite, in this case the opposition forces, for its own
purpose fills the gap of political leadership in the ethnic uprising. Then
the battle over state power intensifies devastating the country’s human
and material resources including the state itself as observed in Somalia.
On the part of most of the
opposition forces there seems a growing realisation of the ensuing danger
of large-scale violent conflict if the current situation is allowed to
continue. The biggest danger is the emergence of an organised force of
ethnic based extremists, some of them taking the form of racism or
religious fundamentalism and who negate basic principles of democracy. The
other danger comes from the anti-ethnic extremists who could not
comprehend unity with diversity. This cluster of self declared politicians
who venture for ethnic cleansing are also equally racist and dangerous for
the unity of the country.
In a democratic system,
self-determination and national unity are two concomitant categories and
not mutually exclusive notions, as the extremists want us to believe. Yet,
under dictatorial system of the EPRDF, self-determination like all
democratic rights will always suffer repression, hence inducing a series
of confrontations leading to fragmentation and recurring conflicts that
knocks down the structure on which the state has to rest.
Today, as we speak, the EPRDF
government which has failed to establish a popular base and mandate
because of its undemocratic evolution to power and bad administrative
practices have lost the political clout and the moral ground to govern.
The country is in turmoil. The EPRDF leadership is splintered into two
irreconcilable clusters of leaders. The army and police are on the streets
to quell the uprising, sadly killing and wounding students demonstrating
for change.
Given the deep rooted and
complex predicaments Ethiopia is entangled with, heavy responsibility
rests on the democratic opposition forces to avert the looming
catastrophe. It is this democratic force, if organised in a common
democratic front that could prevent the extremist forces who found fertile
ground to grow in the ominous ethnic policy of the EPRDF, from dictating
their short sighted and destructive terms of struggle. It is only the
democratic forces who can forge a political mechanism that could empower
the people to exercise their political rights in creating a dynamic
constitution that could permanently enable them to influence the conduct
and modality of a government they set up. Again, it is the democratic
forces that could envisage a positive policy of self-determination, a
notion which has galvanised almost the entire country and help create
unity with all the cultural, linguistic, religious and historical
diversity respected. If individuals, groups or organizations could truly
uphold these principles, there is no reason why they could not forge a
broader front or a stronger party, that could force the EPRDF out of
office and lead the country in peace to progress.
VI. Looking for Strategic
Remedies
Bringing the case of Ethiopia
into picture, I have tried to establish the link between the authoritarian
leadership, the fragmented elite and the strangled civil society on one
hand and the global powers and the NGOs who could not terrace pass the
powers realm of interest on the other – a link apparently one side could
not afford to avoid and with no concern to the emergence and empowerment
of civil society.
Abraham Lincoln, in his 19 May
1856 speech said “ The ballot is stronger than the bullet” and later in 10
Nov. 1864 added “We cannot have free government with out election; and if
the rebellion could force us to forego or postpone a national election, it
might fairly claim to have already conquered and ruined us.” I think close
observation of the present Ethiopian power politics can reveal what
President Lincoln warned, that is the Ethiopian civil society is almost
conquered and about to be ruined. That seems the pattern in most of
African States, except for South Africa and some very few states that
managed to run a fair election and peaceful transfer of power.
Contemporary US administrations
and European powers however seem to brush aside what Abraham Lincoln set
straight some 145 years ago. Had the US and British administrations who in
1991 facilitated the transfer of power from the military dictators to the
EPRDF included opposition parties and members of the civil society in the
process of the transition, both the EPRDF on one hand and the outlawed
opposition and the strangled civil society on the other wouldn’t have
reach the present confrontational posture which might lead to total
anarchy.
Primarily though, it is the
responsibility of the EPRDF leader who were driven by greed of power to
exclude the opposition groups and members of the civil society who could
and must have their share in peace and nation building. With out an
inclusive politics no governance can function in the true sense of its
meaning. Even if it seems to function in the beginning, definitely as the
case in Ethiopia has demonstrated it is temporary and more devastating.
The requisite for peace and
durable governance is then empowerment of the civil society accompanied by
institutional structure that has an effective influence over governing
bodies and an inclusive politics based on popular constitution that
accommodates any opposition which other wise could be the seed of
conflict.
Secondly, a mechanism has to be
devised to depart from the syndicated relationship of the African elite
and the NGOs whose expertise and resources should be based on realities at
the grassroots level and controlled by an organised civil society. The culture of settling differences through violent means could not be left to Africans alone. The Western World too is engaged in selected violent confrontations with the unbridled production of instruments of violence, thereby posing a potential threat that could be unleashed any time the possessor deems it necessary. When people have to live under such state of affair, they get used to and also accept it as means of resolving differences or conflicts. Societies, whichever side they belong to benefit nothing from war. In fact they have rather much more fundamental interests that bring them together. Peace, free movement, exchange of ideas and resources, healthy environment etc. are some of common ideals they share and nurture. A consorted effort expounding the culture of peace in general and resolving conflicting interests peacefully in particular, concomitantly addressing the injustice that induces people to react, is absolutely indispensable.
An old Ethiopian saying goes:
“If we don’t change our direction, we might end up where we are heading.”
Although there seems to be a
positive intention of the international community to empower civil
society, the practical application of the intent has always been
frustrating, especially when it comes to Africa and Ethiopia in
particular. Whatever contribution the international community may set for
Africa, it has to be: (A) Empowerment oriented;
(C)
There has to be
concerted pressure nationally, regionally and internationally on
governments that resist this direct approach to better government in 21st
century Africa.
The numerous Ethiopian
intellectuals, if organized under a broad national visionary program of
empowering the Ethiopian society and lead them to be masters of their
destiny, an accountable and a transparent government could be set up and
foreign actors would be forced to accept a fair relationship. Such a
relationship could be the ground for stable and sustainable popular
government with accountability and transparency as obvious norms of a
functioning state.
This is a challenging
direction, but a direction where we should head to if the deep rooted
problems of Africa in general and that of Ethiopia in particular are to
terminate.
ACRONYMS
AAPO
All Amhara People’s Organisation
ALF
Afar Liberation Front
ANDM
Amhara National Democratic Movement
ARDU
Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union
CAFPD
Coalition of Alternative Forces for Peace and Development
COEDF
Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces
EDU
Ethiopian Democratic Union
EHRCO
Ethiopian Human Rights Council
ELF
Eritrean Liberation Front
EPDM
Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement
EPLF
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
EPRDF
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party
MEDHINE
Ethiopian Medhine Democratic Front
MEISON
All Ethiopian Socialist Movement
MLLT
Marxist Leninist League of Tigray
MNCPE
Multi-National Congress Party of Ethiopia
OLF
Oromo Liberation Front
ONC
Oromo National Congress
ONLF
Ogadeni National Liberation Front
OPDO
Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation
SEPDU
Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic Coalition
TAND
Tigris Alliance for National Democracy
TGE
Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TLF
Tigray Liberation Front
TNO
Tigrayan National Organisation
TPDM
Tigray People’s Democratic Movement
TPLF
Tigray People’s Liberation Front
TTE
Tigray Tigrigni Ethiopia
Select References Adhana Haile, A. 1995, August. ‘Tigray: The Emergence of a Nation within the Ethiopian Polity’, a paper presented to the conference on Ethnicity and the State in East Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Africa Confidential. 1995, September, Vol. 36 No.19. Amnesty International. 1995, April. ‘Ethiopia, Accountability Past and Present: Human Rights in Transition,’ AI Index: AFR/25/6/95, London. Araya, M. 1996, September. ‘Ethiopia’s Fate and Her Democratic Forces’ in Ethiopian Review, pgs. 30-32, Los Angeles. Clapham, C. 1968. Haile Selassie’s Government. Longman, London. CPJ. 1994, March. ‘Ethiopia: Attacks on the Press in 1993’ in A World-wide Survey, New York. EHRCO. 1994, August. ‘The Human Rights Situation in Ethiopia, 7th Report, Addis Abeba, Ethiopia. EHRCO. 1996, September. ‘The Human Rights Situation in Ethiopia’, 10th Report, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Ellis, S. 1996. Africa Now: People, Policies & Institutions, London. EPLF. 1981, January. Eske Meche Torenet? (War Till When?), Dept. of Information, Port Sudan. Ethiopian Commentator. 1993, May. Interview with M. Baas, US Ambassador to Ethiopia, Michigan. EPRDF. 1991, May. News Bulletin European Parliament. 2001. ‘Resolution on Human Rights in Ethiopia’, B5-0360, 0363, 0370, 0376, 0386 and B5-0396/2001. Halliday, F. & Molyneux, M. 1981. The Ethiopian Revolution, Verso, London. Harris, N. 1990. National Liberation, London: I.B. Tauris Keane, J. 1995. ‘Nations, Nationalism and European Citizens’ in Notions of Nationalism, Editor Periwal, S., Budapest. Dowden, R. 1989, November 28. ‘Tigrayans Home in on Ethiopian’s Lifeline’ Interview with M. Zenawi, Prime Minister of Ethiopia, in The Independent, pg.19, London. Lyons, T. 1996. ‘Closing the Transition: the May 1995 Elections in Ethiopia in The Journal of Modern African Studies, Volume 34, Number 1. pgs.121-142. Markakis, J. 1990. National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa, London: Zed Books Ltd. MLLT1985, July. Constitution of the Marxist Leninist League of Tigray. (Tigrigna edition). Foreign Office, S.W.1. 1943, September. Addis Ababa Telegram No. 762. FO 371/35607 XC 14980. London Public Record Office. Norwegian Observer Group. 1992. ‘Local and Regional Elections in Ethiopia 21 June 1992’, Human Rights Report, No.1, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Human Rights. Roosens, E. 1989. Creating Ethnicity: The Process of Ethnogenesis, London: Sage Publications. Prouty, C. 1986. Empress Taytu and Menilek II: Ethiopia 1883- 1910, New Jersey, The Red Sea Press. Tamrat, T. 1972, Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527, Oxford: Clarendon Press. See Manifesto of the TPLF, Vol. I, pg. 24, published Feb. 1976, which declared that the first task of the TPLF would be “ the establishment of an independent democratic republic of Tigray”. This was the stand of the present EPRDF leaders and was a point of difference with the author who consistently fought for a democratic unity of Ethiopia.
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